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Abstract
Bayesian hierarchical models are a methodology for aggregation and synthesis of data
from heterogeneous settings, used widely in statistics and other disciplines. I apply this
framework to the evidence from 7 randomized experiments of expanding access to microcredit
to assess the general impact of the intervention on household outcomes and the heterogeneity
in this impact across sites. The results suggest that the effect of microcredit is likely to be
positive but small relative to control group average levels, and the possibility of a negative
impact cannot be ruled out. By contrast, common meta-analytic methods that pool all
the data without assessing the heterogeneity misleadingly produce “statistically significant”
results in 2 of the 6 household outcomes. Standard pooling metrics for the studies indicate
on average 60% pooling on the treatment effects, suggesting that the site-specific effects are
reasonably externally valid, and thus informative for each other and for the general case.
The cross-study heterogeneity is almost entirely generated by heterogeneous effects for the
27% households who previously operated businesses before microcredit expansion, although
this group is likely to see much larger impacts overall. A Ridge regression procedure to
assess the correlations between site-specific covariates and treatment effects indicates that
the remaining heterogeneity is strongly correlated with differences in economic variables, but
not with differences in study design protocols. The average interest rate and the average
loan size have the strongest correlation with the treatment effects, and both are negative.
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1 Introduction
Researchers and policymakers increasingly have access to results from several experimental
studies of the same phenomenon. The question of how to aggregate the results of multiple
experiments across different contexts is now pertinent. Different studies of the same policy or
intervention often produce different results, but both the extent of the true variation in the
underlying treatment effects and the source of such variation are often unclear. While there
is a growing understanding of the need to aggregate across studies and assess this underlying
variation, and several attempts at cross-study aggregation already in the literature (e.g. Vivalt
2016, Pritchett and Sandefur 2015), there is currently no consensus in economics regarding the
appropriate methodology. But there is a statistical methodology which is ideally suited to ag-
gregating evidence and assessing the variation in effects across study sites, and has already been
used for this purpose by statisticians: Bayesian hierarchical models and their associated metrics
of heterogeneity (Rubin 1981, Gelman et al 2004). In this paper I apply this methodology to
the data from seven randomized controlled trials of microcredit expansions.
There are several efforts to aggregate evidence from the various microcredit studies in the
form of review articles, such as Banerjee (2013) or Banerjee et al (2015a). This relatively
informal approach has the advantage of incorporating expert judgment, but offers no clear way
to keep track of the multiple dimensions of heterogeneity between the studies. As a result, review
articles often employ simple but misleading aggregation techniques such as “vote counting” the
statistically significant and insignificant results - for examples see Sandefur (2015) or Banerjee
et al (2015a), for a critique of vote counting see Hedges and Olkin (1980) or section 9.4.11 of the
Cochrane Handbook (Higgins and Green 2011). Formal aggregation methods can avoid these
heuristics and keep track of the differences across studies more rigorously.
Yet formally aggregating the evidence from studies performed in different countries with dif-
ferent implementation and experimental protocols is a challenging task. The interventions in
the microcredit literature are fundamentally similar but not exactly the same, which is almost
always the case in economics. The economic and social contexts of the study sites are different,
but the extent to which these differences affect the experimental outcomes is unknown. Com-
puting the arithmetic mean of the estimated treatment effects from each study does not capture
our best understanding of the evidence, not even if the estimates are weighted inversely to their
standard errors or other sample variability metrics. On the one hand, if these site-specific treat-
ment effects are very different then averaging or “pooling” them is not a useful exercise, as this
average does not describe a coherent population object. But on the other hand, if the effects
are similar enough that we can learn something across contexts, then it is inefficient even to
compute these site-specific effects in isolation from one another, and we should use all the data
to adjust our estimate the effect in each site.
In economics, researchers often have access to the actual datasets from the randomised con-
trolled trials (RCTs) we seek to aggregate. Many economics journals, particularly journals
published by the American Economics Association such as The American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, require the experimental data to be published alongside the studies. Most
formal techniques for aggregation and meta-analysis use the reported point estimates and stan-
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dard errors as their input data, because meta-analysts in statistics and other fields typically did
not have access to the underlying study’s “microdata”. In principle, access to the microdata
allows for a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the evidence. It may be that hetero-
geneity in the observed effects of an intervention reflect contextual differences between the study
protocols, national or local environments, or even the composition of types of households in each
site. It is not possible to explore the role of these covariates without access to the microdata.
This paper constitutes a first attempt to use Bayesian hierarchical models to aggregate the
microdata from multiple RCTs in economics. These models are well suited to the address
the challenges of aggregation across heterogeneous contexts, and have been used in statistics
and medicine since at least 1981 (see Rubin 1981, Gelman et al 2004). They are now being
adopted into economics as a result of the increasing availability of multiple RCTs of similar
interventions, but have not yet been applied to microdata (see Burke et al 2014, Vivalt 2015).
In this paper I aggregate and synthesise the results from all existing RCTs of expanding access
to microcredit: Angelucci et al (2015), Attanasio et al (2015), Augsberg et al (2015), Banerjee et
al (2015b), Crepon et al (2015), Karlan and Zinman (2011), and Tarozzi et al (2015). Due to the
policies of the two journals that published these papers - the AEJ:Applied and Science - all the
microdata from these RCTs is freely available online. I fit Bayesian hierarchical models to the
microdata from these studies to estimate the set of site-specific treatment effects on outcomes
at the household level, as well as the general treatment effect common to all sites. The models
are equipped with several metrics to quantify the strength of the relationship between the site-
specific effects, and thus the relative importance or predictive power of the general treatment
effect for the set of broadly comparable sites.
The results suggest that the effect of microcredit access is likely to be positive but small
in magnitude relative to control group average levels, and the possibility of a negative impact
cannot be ruled out. I find that the site-specific effects are strongly related with 60% pooling on
average, indicating that the generalized effect is a reasonably informative object. This suggests
reasonably high external validity within the class of comparable sites, although there is some
remaining heterogeneity. Splitting the treatment effect apart according to contextual variables
at the household level reveals that the detected heterogeneity in effects across sites is almost
entirely driven by heterogeneous effects for the 27% of households who operated a business
prior to microcredit expansion. A Bayesian Ridge procedure to assess the correlation between
treatment effects and study-specific contextual variables indicates that economic variables such
as the average interest rate and loan size are more predictive of differences in treatment effects
than study protocol variables such as the unit of randomization. These results differ substantially
from the conclusions drawn in informal review articles such as Banerjee et al (2015a) and previous
attempts to formally aggregate evidence on microcredit such as Pritchett and Sandefur (2015)
and Vivalt (2016) which failed to separate sampling variation in the estimates from genuine
underlying heterogeneity.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Bayesian Hierarchical Models
The Bayesian hierarchical approach to multi-study aggregation is built on the model used in
Rubin (1981) to analyze the results of several parallel experiments. The model is concerned
with K studies or “sites” in which researchers performed similar interventions and measured the
impact on similar outcomes. The model is fit to the set of estimated treatment effects reported
in the K different studies, denoted {τˆk}Kk=1, and their estimated standard errors {sˆeτk}Kk=1. The
core of the model is a hierarchical structure in which each site has its own treatment effect, τk,
but these effects are all drawn from a common “parent distribution” governed by an unknown
mean and variance parameters (τ, σ2τ ). The Rubin (1981) model uses a Normal-Normal structure:
τˆk ∼ N(τk, sˆe2k) ∀ k
τk ∼ N(τ, σ2τ ) ∀ k.
(2.1)
The functional form of the lower level of the likelihood is simply the sampling distribution
of the estimators used in each site, and the formulation in Rubin (1981) applies as long as
the estimator is unbiased and asymptotically normal. As RCTs in economics are typically
analyzed using OLS regressions, and the analysis of each RCT typically makes the assumption
of unbiasedness and asymptotic Normality to calculate their standard errors, the lower level
functional form imposes no more structure than the original papers. The choice of functional
form for the distribution in the upper level of the likelihood is less obvious. The Normal was
chosen for Rubin (1981) for tractability and because it has attractive frequentist properties,
delivering lower mean squared error for estimating the set {τk}Kk=1 relative to other options
(Efron and Morris, 1977).
The model above can be generalized using various functional forms and can easily include
other pieces of information, as long as all K studies report them. For the task of modeling
heterogeneity in the impact of microcredit, the value of the control group mean µk is plausibly
related to the size of the treatment effect τk in each site, though the sign and magnitude of the
correlation is unknown. This is often the case in economics and so I propose to incorporate this
useful information, both to improve our inference on the treatment effects and to try to detect
and understand the correlation here. The estimated control mean µˆk along with its standard
error sˆeµk can be modeled as follows:
τˆk ∼ N(τk, sˆe2τk) ∀ k
µˆk ∼ N(µk, sˆe2µk) ∀ k(
µk
τk
)
∼ N
((
µ
τ
)
, V
)
where V =
[
σ2µ στµ
στµ σ
2
τ
]
∀ k.
(2.2)
Although this model can be estimated using the reported parameters, I have access to the full
data from the seven studies of microcredit expansions. Hence, I can fit a hierarchical regression
model directly to the study outcomes in the spirit of the Rubin (1981) model. Consider some
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outcome of interest, such as profits or consumption for a household i in study site k, denoted
yik. Denote the binary indicator of treatment status by Tik. Allow the variance of the outcome
variable yik to vary across sites, so σ2yk may differ across k. Then the following full data model
captures the key structure of Rubin (1981) and can be fit to the microdata from all K studies:
yik ∼ N(µk + τkTik, σ2yk) ∀ i, k(
µk
τk
)
∼ N
((
µ
τ
)
, V
)
where V =
[
σ2µ στµ
στµ σ
2
τ
]
∀ k.
(2.3)
Using the microdata, it is possible possible to further explore the heterogeneity across settings
using covariates either at the household level or at the site level.1 In the microcredit studies,
researchers identified several important covariates such as a household’s previous business expe-
rience (Banerjee et al 2015b, Crepon et al 2015). It would be informative to know how much of
the variation across settings is due to variation in composition of the households in each sample.
This exercise is possible with the microdata even if these interactions models were not reported
in all of the original papers, as long as the covariates were recorded. Moreover, because the
subgroup analyses from one paper can be extended to the rest of the papers, this sheds light on
how general or replicable any detected subgroup effect really is. Consider L relevant covariates,
and denote these covariates Xik for household i in site k. To specify a full interactions model
- that is, to examine the power set of subgroups - we now have 2L intercept terms and 2L
slope terms, henceforth indexed by l with a slight abuse of notation. There are many possible
statistical dependence structures between the various treatment effects and means across sites
and subgroups that can be built on framework of equations 2.3. Below is one that is quite
tractable, although it is restrictive in that it enforces independence across the treatment effects
in the 2L subgroup blocks. Here Xik are all binary, so let pi(l) : {1, 2, . . . , 2L} → {0, 1}L be
the bijection that defines the full set of interactions of these variables. For I ∈ {0, 1}L, denote
XIik =
∏L
l=1[X lik]1{Il=1}, so that the likelihood is:
yik ∼ N
 2L∑
l=1
[µlk + τ lkTik]X
pi(l)
ik , σ
2
yk
 ∀ i, k
(
µlk
τ lk
)
∼ N
((
µl
τ l
)
, Vl
)
where Vl =
 σ2µl στ lµl
στ lµl σ
2
τ l
∀ l, k.
(2.4)
Similarly, important covariates may exist at the site or study level. These include economic
and political variables that distinguish the study sites and partner institutions from each other,
as well as study protocol variables such as the unit of randomization (village versus individual).
Ideally, we want to estimate the conditional distribution of the treatment effects given these
variables, as this allows policymakers to form a more precise understanding of the most likely
impact that an intervention would have in their specific setting. In some cases, however, there
1If intermediate levels are specified in the data, such as a village, district or city, there may also be important
variation along these dimensions that could be incorporated. If indeed these are important then the above model
will underestimate the correlations between households in these areas, and will have misleadingly small posterior
intervals in that case. However not all the microcredit studies have such intermediate units.
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will be more site-level covariates than sites, which means that such conditioning will not be
possible without severe overfitting. In this case, the researcher can still gain an understanding
of the relative importance of these covariates by employing regularization or sparsity estimation
procedures at the upper level, such as Ridge or Lasso. These can be implemented within the
Bayesian framework via strong priors that push the regression coefficients of these site-level
variables down to zero. Denote these covariates X and suppose we have M such covariates
that could explain or predict the variation in the treatment effect. Then the following Bayesian
hierarchical model would provide this conditioning, or conditioning plus regularization, as the
case may be:
yik ∼ N(µk + τkTik, σ2yk) ∀ i, k(
µk
τk
)
∼ N
((
µ+Xβµ
τ +Xβτ
)
, V
)
where V =
[
σ2µ στµ
στµ σ
2
τ
]
∀ k.
βµ ∼ N(0, σ2βµ)
βτ ∼ N(0, σ2βτ )
(2.5)
Conceptually, all of these models address the basic tension in aggregation across studies
by specifying heterogeneous treatment effects across sites while allowing for the existence of
a common component τ . The hierarchical structure is agnostic about the extent to which
the common component determines the treatment effect in each site, because the parameter
governing its influence, σ2τ , is itself estimated from data. By considering any σ2τ ∈ [0,∞),
the structure nests both the “full pooling” case in which there is no heterogeneity across sites
(σ2τ = 0), and the “no pooling” case in which the sites have no common component (σ2τ →∞).
By allowing the data to determine the most likely value of σ2τ , hierarchical models implement
“partial pooling” (Gelman et al 2004).
The core challenge addressed by the hierarchical framework is the separation of sampling
variation from genuine heterogeneity in treatment effects across sites. This can only be done
by imposing some structure on the problem. A parametric likelihood permits us to infer the
genuine heterogeneity using the relative position of the site-specific treatment effects combined
with information about their differing precision due to the differing variability in the outcomes
across settings. This functional form is what permits us to implement the partial pooling in
this flexible structure that does not take a stand a priori on the relative size of the sampling
variation and the genuine effect heterogeneity. Without this structure, or something like it, the
analyst must choose either a no pooling model which attributes all variation across studies to
genuine treatment effect heterogeneity, or a full pooling model which attributes it purely to
sampling variation.
Popular “functional form free” approaches to analyzing multi-study data rely on these stronger
assumptions. Computing a precision-weighted average of the K estimated treatment effects is
a full pooling technique, as is pooling the data and running one regression via ordinary least
squares. These approaches will underestimate the heterogeneity across sites if the strict full
pooling assumption is false. Running K different regressions via ordinary least squares is a no
pooling model, and the variability in the set {τˆk}Kk=1 will overestimate the heterogeneity across
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sites if the strict no pooling assumption is false. This overestimation occurs both because the
K separated regressions fail to allow inference across settings via partial pooling, and because
the procedure implicitly attributes all of the variation to genuine underlying heterogeneity (for
an example of such analysis, see Pritchett and Sandefur 2015). Thus, while the parametric
likelihood makes the model appear more structured than the typical econometric analyses of
randomized trials, in fact this set up allows us to dispense with these more restrictive structures
and assumptions.
These models do require that the treatment effects be “exchangeable” in order to perform
well, which means that their joint distribution must be invariant to permutation of theK indices.
For example, this means that we do not have any knowledge of the ordering of the treatment
effects - although we know that they may be different, and we can think of reasons why one site
may have a larger or smaller effect than another site, we do not actually know how the sites
will be ordered until we see the data. If we know that a covariate should be correlated with
the treatment effects, we can use the model in equation 2.5 which will then require conditional
exchangeability. Overall this requirement means that we will only be able to assess external
validity, and generalizability, for the set of sites which are in fact exchangeable. Any future site
for which we wish to predict or infer the treatment effect must be exchangeable with the set of
sites we have already studied. Using only the RCT data means that we can generalize to the set
of study sites that could plausibly have been the location of an RCT of the intervention we study,
but we cannot transport our results outside of this set. Confining ourselves to this interpretation
allows us to avoid the site-selection issues that arise when attempting to extrapolate to sites
that are too fundamentally different to the sites studied in the literature.
2.2 Estimation
Estimating the unknown parameters specified in the hierarchical likelihoods of models 2.1-2.4 is
challenging because the likely values of the parameters on the lower level are influenced by the
values of the parameters at the upper level, which introduces ripples in the likelihood. In theory
either Maximum Likelihood methods or Bayesian methods can be used, but in practice there are
strong reasons to prefer Bayesian inference for this problem. The primary issue with Maximum
Likelihood is that to get tractability the estimation is done via “Empirical Bayes”, which first
estimates the upper level parameters and then plugs these point estimates into the lower level to
estimate the lower level parameters. By conditioning on a single value of the hyperparameters,
this procedure systematically underestimates the uncertainty at the lower level of the model.
By contrast, Bayesian inference proceeds via estimation of the full joint posterior distribution of
all unknown parameters simultaneously, from which the marginal distributions provide accurate
uncertainty intervals.
The Bayesian approach does not require the compromises made by the MLE method for
tractability because it performs estimation using a powerful simulation technique called Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods. These methods require a proper posterior distribution as the
target distribution, which typically necessitates the use of proper prior distributions on the
unknown parameters. These priors also allow the researcher to improve the estimation by
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targeting regions of the parameter space that are more likely to contain relevant values; if only
vague knowledge of this is obtainable, then the priors can be made quite diffuse (sometimes
called “weakly informative”). If substantial expert knowledge of the likely values is available
before seeing the data, this can of course be incorporated via stronger priors. Even if the
prior distributions are incorrectly centered, sufficiently diffuse priors can still improve the mean
squared error of the estimation by reducing the variance at the cost of some increase in bias -
that is, the prior regularizes the estimates.
Bayesian inference also provides a framework for decision-making about policy and future
research that has no counterpart in frequentist inference. Indeed, our goal itself is underpinned
by Bayesian thinking: we seek to update our understanding of the unknown parameters in one
location using the information about the parameters from other locations. Moreover, if we
wish to make decisions accounting for our uncertainty about unknown parameters, the correct
object to take expectations over is the posterior distribution of the unknown, not the sampling
distribution of an estimator of the unknown. Because the object of interest for policymakers
is the distribution of the treatment effect in a hypothetical future site, τK+1, this distribution
must be computed accounting for the full joint posterior uncertainty rather than conditioning
on a particular point estimate or even a particular interval estimate - the Bayesian approach
provides this in the form of posterior predictive inference, which has no frequentist equivalent.
In this paper, I perform Bayesian inference with the following priors for the main specification
of the model described in equations 2.3:(
µ
τ
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
[
10002 0
0 10002
])
σyk ∼ U [0, 100000] ∀ k
V = diag(θ)Ωdiag(θ)
θ ∼ Cauchy(0, 10)
Ω ∼ LKJcorr(3).
(2.6)
The decomposition of the V matrix into a correlation matrix Ω and scaling factor θ follows the
advice in Gelman and Hill (2007). The Cauchy(0, 10) on θ permits the scaling to vary widely,
and the LKJcorr(3) in Ω is a prior over the space of all correlation matrices which favors the
region around independent or uncorrelated variables (Stan Development Team, 2014). In this
case, the prior is informed by economic theory that suggests this correlation could take either
sign: perhaps microcredit only works for relatively prosperous entrepreneurs, but perhaps it has
diminishing marginal returns. With only 7 studies, we should not update our beliefs about this
correlation too dramatically, so a stronger prior towards zero is warranted. In any case, the
estimation of both the hypervariance θ and the correlations in Ω is a challenging exercise and
with so little data the priors will typically have an influence on the posterior inference. Indeed, it
is desirable to inject prior information here rather than rely on a “raw” correlation computed in
a low data environment, which is inherently noisy. However, as a robustness check, in this paper
I will also fit the classical Rubin (1981) model, whose inferences are not sensitive to the priors
when they are sufficiently diffuse. I will also fit a version of the main specification (equations
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2.3) which imposes independence between the sets {τk}Kk=1 and {µk}Kk=1, thereby eliminating
that sensitivity. While sensitivity to priors can complicate the inference, the elimination of the
sensitivity can only be done using restricted functional forms, so it is best to examine the full
set of results rather than relying on the simpler models.
The posterior distribution for the basic full-data model is proportional to the product of the
likelihood in equations 2.3 and the prior in equations 2.6:
p(τ, µ, τ1, τ2, . . . |Y ) ∝ ΠNi=1ΠKk=1(N(yik|µk + τkTik, σ2yk))
×ΠKk=1(N((µk, τk)|(µ, τ), V )
×N((µ, τ)|(0, 0), I2)× Cauchy(0, 2.5)× LKJcorr(2)
(2.7)
This is not a known distribution, but it can be fully characterized via simulation using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC). The basic intuition behind MCMC methods is the con-
struction of a Markov chain which has the posterior distribution as its invariant distribution,
so that in the limit, the draws from the chain are ergodic draws from the posterior. This chain
is constructed by drawing from known distributions at each “step” and using a probabilistic
accept/reject rule for the draw based on the posterior distribution’s value at the draw.
I use a particular subset of MCMC methods called Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) methods
throughout this paper, which are particularly suited to estimating hierarchical models (Betan-
court and Girolami, 2013). HMC uses discretized Hamiltonian dynamics to sample from the
posterior, and has shown good performance especially combined with the No-U-Turn sampling
method (NUTS) to auto-tune the step sizes in the chain (Gelman and Hoffman, 2011). HMC
with NUTS is easy to implement because it can be done automatically in Stan, which is a free
software module that calls C++ to fit Bayesian models from R or Python (Stan Development
Team, 2014). Stan often requires no more input from the user than typing the equations for the
likelihood and priors, although more complex models benefit from code written more efficiently
than that. Stan automatically reports the posterior means (eg. τ˜ for τ) and their marginalized
posterior variances (eg. s˜e2τ ), supplying both the parameter values most likely to be true given
the data and the degree of certainty we should have about their value. Stan also automatically
reports the marginal 95% credible intervals and 50% credible intervals.
Stan also computes and reports several performance metrics and convergence diagnostics for
the HMC in every model it fits. First, it reports the Monte Carlo error of the posterior mean,
which should be small relative to the magnitude of the mean if the sampler has converged.
Second, it computes the Rˆ metric of Gelman and Rubin (1992) by randomly perturbing the
starting points for the HMC chains and then checking the between variance of the chains relative
to the within-chain variance. If all the chains have converged to the posterior, their within
variance should be the same as their between variance: the Rˆ is the ratio of these variances and
should be close to 1. For each model, I run 4 chains and accept Rˆ < 1.1.
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2.3 Pooling Metrics
Bayesian hierarchical models come equipped with several natural metrics to assess the extent of
pooling across sites shown in the posterior distribution, developed and studied by statisticians
(Gelman et al 2004, Gelman and Pardoe 2006). In the context of multi-study aggregation, the
extent of pooling across study sites has a natural interpretation as a measure of external validity.
The extreme case of full pooling (σ2τ = 0) corresponds to perfect external validity wherein all
τk = τ , so by conducting a study in one site we learn as much about the treatment effect for
all K sites as we do for the specific site we study. The estimate may be noisy or have other
problems, but it is equally valid for site k as for site k′. The no pooling case, where τ is an
uninformative object (σ2τ →∞), corresponds to zero external validity because we learn nothing
about site k′ from site k. An obvious metric of external validity in this framework is therefore
the magnitude of σ2τ , and a good estimate for it is the posterior mean denoted σ˜2τ .
The drawback of using σ˜2τ as a pooling metric is that it is not clear what exactly constitutes
a large or small value of this parameter in any given context. Thus, while it is important
to report and interpret σ˜2τ , it is also useful to examine pooling metrics whose magnitude is
easily interpretable. These include the conventional “pooling factor” metric, defined as follows
(Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 477):
ω(τk) =
sˆe2k
σ˜2τ + sˆe2k
. (2.8)
This metric has support on [0,1] because it decomposes the potential variation in the estimate in
site k into genuine underlying uncertainty and sampling error. It compares the magnitude of σ˜2τ
to the magnitude of sˆe2k, the sampling variation in the separated estimate of the treatment effect
from site k. Here, ω(τk) > 0.5 indicates that σ˜2τ is smaller than the sampling variation, indicating
substantial pooling of information and a “small” σ˜2τ . If the average of these K pooling metrics
across sites is above 0.5, then this suggests the genuine underlying heterogeneity is smaller than
the average sampling variance. In that case, τk is a better signal of τ than τˆk is of τk, and if we
are comfortable using our no-pooling model for each site, we should be comfortable extrapolating
to the general case.
The fact that the ω(τk) uses sampling variation as a comparison is both a feature and a
drawback. In one sense this is exactly the right comparison, since we are scoring how much we
learned about site k′ by analysing data from site k against how much we learned about site k
by analyzing data from site k, which is captured by the sampling variation in τˆk. Yet in another
sense, if the sampling variation is very large or small due to an unusually small or large sample
size or level of volatility or noise in the data, it may be beneficial to have an alternative pooling
metric available. There are two additional metrics I consider in this paper which make for useful
alternatives. The first such metric is a “brute force” version of the conventional pooling metric,
which I define as follows:
ωb(τk) ≡ {ω : τ˜k = ωτ˜ + (1− ω)τˆk}. (2.9)
This metric scores how closely aligned the posterior mean of the treatment effect in site k,
denoted τ˜k, is to the posterior mean of the general effect τ˜ versus the separated no-pooling
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estimate τˆk. Here, ωb(τk) > 0.5 indicates that the generalized treatment effect is actually more
informative about the effect in site k than the separated estimate from site k is for site k (because
τ˜k as our best estimate of the effect in site k). The motivation for computing this ωb(τk) is that
in the Rubin (1981) model it is actually identical to the conventional pooling metric, but it
is not identical in more complex models that pool across multiple parameters (such as model
2.3). Solving for ωb(τk) by simple algebra is a “brute force” approach which provides a useful
additional metric in these more complex models. I manually constrain it to take values between
[0, 1] as the rare occasions on which it falls outside this range are due to shrinkage on other
parameters rather than due to any feature of the parameters in question.
Another pooling metric that can be computed for these models is the “generalized pooling
factor” defined in Gelman and Pardoe (2006), which takes a different approach using posterior
variation in the deviations of each τk from τ . Let Epost[.] denote the expectation taken with
respect to the full posterior distribution, and define k = τk − τ . Then the generalized pooling
factor for τ is defined:
λτ ≡ 1−
1
K−1
∑K
k=1(Epost[k]− Epost[k])2
Epost[ 1K−1
∑K
k=1(k − ¯k)2]
. (2.10)
The denominator is the posterior average variance of the errors, and the numerator is the variance
of the posterior average error across sites. If the numerator is relatively large then there is very
little pooling in the sense that the variance in the errors is largely determined by variance across
the blocks of site-specific errors; if the numerator is relatively small then there is substantial
pooling. Gelman and Pardoe (2006) suggest interpreting λτ > 0.5 as indicating a higher degree
of general or “population-level” information relative to the degree of site-specific information.
For policy purposes, the most relevant metric is the total uncertainty about the treatment
effect in future sites. This is captured by the distribution of the treatment effect in the next site,
τK+1. While economists often make conditional predictions about such objects, the Bayesian
approach allows us to estimate the entire marginal posterior predictive distribution, thereby
accurately characterizing the uncertainty. While the posterior inference on τ provides us with
some understanding of the likely impact in any exchangeable site not yet studied, as E[τK+1] = τ ,
it does not provide the whole story. To understand the predictive distribution of τK+1 we need to
know not only τ and its posterior uncertainty but the posterior estimate of the average dispersion
of the τk draws around this τ . It is however still not enough to know the posterior mean value of
σ2τ - we need to account for our uncertainty about this parameter as well. The Bayesian approach
allows us to estimate the posterior distribution of the new parameter τK+1 marginalizing over
the joint posterior distribution of τ and σ2τ : this is called the marginal posterior predictive
distribution of τK+1 and is the only way to accurately capture the total uncertainty about this
effect.
3 The General Impact of Microcredit Expansions
Aggregation across multiple contexts allows the estimation of the general impact of expanding
access to microcredit services on household outcomes. In all the Bayesian hierarchical models
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from section 2 this general effect is captured by τ , the mean of the parent distribution from which
all site-specific treatment effects are drawn. This is the expected value of the treatment effect
in all sites and in any future site which is broadly comparable to the current set of sites. This is
precisely the quantity of interest for policymakers who must make decisions about interventions
in places that have not yet been studied in an RCT. In this section I report results for household
business profit, revenues and expenditures, as well as household consumption, consumer durables
spending and “temptation goods” spending. The latter 3 variables were unfortunately collected
only by a subset of studies but are important enough in the theoretical literature on microcredit
that they should be aggregated nonetheless (Banerjee 2013).
To estimate τ I fit the model described by equations 2.3 in Stan to each outcome variable
after standardizing all units to USD PPP over a two week period (indexed to 2010 dollars). The
graph in figure 1 shows the posterior distributions of τ for each of the six outcomes, and for
comparison, the sampling distribution of the OLS estimator for the full pooling model’s estimate
of τ . As a robustness check I also fit the independent model specification, with results shown in
figure 2. In both cases the Bayesian hierarchical estimates find more posterior mass around zero
than the full pooling model does, and tends to have wider uncertainty intervals reflecting that
the model typically detects some heterogeneity across studies. These results show that the effect
of microcredit is likely to be positive but small in magnitude relative to control group average
levels, and the possibility of a negative impact cannot be ruled out. For example, the posterior
mean τ˜ for profit is about 7 USD PPP per two weeks, while the control group mean is about
95 USD PPP per two weeks and the control group standard deviation is 160 USD PPP per
two weeks. In summary, while we have much more evidence of positive impact than of negative
impact, the general impact is uncertain and likely to be small.
In two cases, for revenues and temptation goods, the full pooling model gives a substan-
tially different result to the Bayesian hierarchical models. In fact, a frequentist assessment of
the full-pooling OLS analysis would declare these two variables “statistically significant”, but
the hierarchical model finds that their central 95% posterior intervals actually include zero quite
comfortably. This difference arises because the full pooling model can neither detect heterogene-
ity nor incorporate this heterogeneity across sites into its estimate of the uncertainty about τ .
Even for the variables where the full pooling model would not declare “statistical significance”,
it can overestimates the magnitude of the effect, as it does for household business expenditure.
However, for many variables the full pooling model and the Bayesian hierarchical model produce
very similar estimates and intervals. The fact that the full pooling model produces reasonably
similar results to the microcredit model for 4 of the 6 outcomes suggests quite substantial pooling
and high generalizability.
Thus, even when the full pooling model agrees with the Bayesian hierarchical by the standards
of “statistical significance”, the Bayesian model results are interpretable in a way that the full
pooling model results are not. The full pooling model reports an average without any assessment
of the similarity of the objects that comprise the average. The Bayesian hierarchical model
performs this assessment and uses that answer to inform its estimate of the uncertainty interval
- hence, the tightness of the Bayesian interval on the τ estimate already tells us something
about the generalizability. If the site estimates are highly heterogeneous, this will translate
12
into higher posterior uncertainty about the value of τ in the hierarchical model (but not in
the full pooling model). If the estimates are close together then they probably lie quite close
to the mean of the distribution from which they are drawn. For the microcredit data, the
fact that the posterior intervals of τ tend to be somewhat wider than the full-pooling model
intervals suggest that the model detects some heterogeneity among the effects - but as they
are not that much wider, this heterogeneity is not substantial. The posterior intervals of τ for
consumer durables and expenditure are actually tighter than the full-pooling model, reflecting
strong pooling: much of the apparent heterogeneity here was due to sampling variation within
sites, which the hierarchical model can separate out when estimating τ .
To understand why the Bayesian hierarchical model consistently places more probability mass
near zero than the full pooling model does for the microcredit data, it is useful to examine the
study-specific treatment effects {τk}Kk=1 and their no-pooling estimates {τˆk}Kk=1 as shown in
figure 3. Due to the occasionally varying scales of the sampling error, not all intervals have been
fully displayed graphically from end to end, but this information can be found in the tables in
Appendix A. The independent model results for the same variables are shown in 4 and are very
similar. In almost all cases, the more precisely estimated effects are also smaller in magnitude
and typically very close to zero. It is not only that the most precise study is the smallest: the
ordering of study effect sizes from smallest to largest is typically the same as the ordering of
standard errors from smallest to largest. Figure 3 shows that there is substantial pooling for
all outcomes, and the cluster of precise studies near zero pulls the less precise studies dispersed
widely around them in towards zero. Temptation goods exhibits the least amount of shrinkage,
reflecting its relatively low sampling variation compared to the dispersion in site-specific effects,
but extreme results are still pulled somewhat towards zero.
These results differ from the informal analysis of Banerjee et al (2015a), which predicted
that combining the six 2015 studies and running pooled regressions might find a positive and
significant impact on profit. This was a reasonable hope, as four of the isolated τˆk estimates
were positive and reasonably large but statistically insignificant, and pooling does increase power
and precision. But for profit, expenditures, consumption and consumer durables spending the
estimate of τ from the pooled OLS and the marginal posterior from the Bayesian hierarchical
model both have high density around zero. For revenues and temptation goods the full pooling
model does indeed exclude zero in the 95% interval, but the partial pooling model detects enough
heterogeneity to overturn this result. This conclusion also differs from the result in Vivalt
(2016), which reports a small negative treatment effect of microcredit on profit. However, that
analysis aggregates a different set of microcredit studies including observational studies (and
does not incorporate the control means). As we cannot be completely confident in the exclusion
restrictions from the observational studies, the results of aggregating the 7 RCTs may be more
reliable.
4 Quantifying Heterogeneity in the Impact of Microcredit Expansions
The posterior inference on τ provides us with some understanding of the likely impact in a future
site not yet studied, as E[τK+1] = τ , but it does not provide the whole story. To understand the
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predictive distribution of τK+1 we need to know not only τ and its posterior uncertainty but the
posterior estimate of the average dispersion of the τk draws around this τ . This is the external
validity question that motivated our use of the Bayesian hierarchical models, and for good reason:
the seven microcredit studies differed in their economic contexts, study protocols, population
compositions, and along variety of other dimensions. These differences are summarized in figure
5. Clearly, the estimated site-specific treatment effects might be somewhat heterogeneous; the
key question is how heterogeneous the underlying effects really are, and how informative they
are for one another. The fact that the posterior intervals of τ in the Bayesian hierarchical model
are often wider than the full pooling model suggest some heterogeneity, but as they are not very
much wider, the extent of the variation may be quite small. To quantify the heterogeneity in
the site-specific treatment effects of microcredit expansions, I now report the metrics discussed
in section 2.
The graphic in figure 6 displays the pooling metrics, {ω, ω˜, λ} computed for both the treat-
ment effects {τk}Kk=1 and the control group means {µk}Kk=1. As a robustness check I compute
these metrics for the model that enforces independence between µ and τ , and the reuslts are
shown in figure 7. In both cases I find substantial though not full pooling on the treatment
effects, with an average value around 0.6 across all metrics and all outcomes. There is some
heterogeneity in the metrics, and across the outcomes it seems there is more pooling on business
variables than on consumption variables, but overall the pooling is significant. This indicates
that τk tends to be a better signal of τ than the no-pooling estimate τˆk is of τk in these studies.
Hence, if we are comfortable using τˆk to infer τk we can comfortably use any τk to infer τ in this
literature. By contrast, I find virtually zero pooling on the control group means, with an average
value of 0.03 and in many cases exactly zero. These results suggest that whatever similarities
are evident in the treatment effects are not produced by pre-existing similarities in the groups
before they are treated. This literature does study heterogeneous groups, yet we find reasonably
similar treatment effects despite these underlying differences.
The posterior predictive distributions of the treatment effects in future exchangeable sites
are shown in figure 8, with the full-pooling OLS distributions shown for comparison. The
results of the independent model are shown in figure 9, and are somewhat wider than the joint
model, because using the observed (typically positive) correlation between the control mean and
treatment effect improves fit. The lack of full pooling is evident here in both models, as these
intervals are substantially wider than the posterior intervals on τ - although the pooling that
does occur means that they are similar orders of magnitude. These results allow us to make
direct probability statements about the future sites effects. For example, the treatment effect
for almost all the outcomes has a 25% chance of realizing in a socially undesirable direction,
such as a negative impact on profits and consumer durables spending, or a positive impact on
temptation goods spending. More specifically, the next site’s treatment effect on profit has a
50% chance to realize between 0 and 11 USD PPP, a 25% chance of being negative, and a 25%
chance of being higher than 11 USD PPP. It has a 95% chance of realizing between -16 and
40 USD PPP. This is much wider than the OLS estimator’s 95% interval, which spans from
-2 to 17 USD PPP, and hence severely underestimates the true uncertainty around the future
effect. This is not surprising, as the full pooling model will underestimate this uncertainty in
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every case except for perfect full pooling and while the microcredit studies exhibit substantial
pooling, it is certainly not full pooling. Accounting for this uncertainty is crucial in order to
correctly represent the likely outcomes of future interventions to governments and policymakers.
The finding that the treatment effects of microcredit are reasonably informative for one
another differs from the conclusions of Pritchett and Sandefur (2015). This is to be expected, as
they analyzed only the results of the no pooling model, which are much more dispersed than the
partial pooling model results as shown in figure 3. The Pritchett and Sandefur (2015) analysis
is predicated on the idea that there is no common component to the site-specific effects: if there
is such a component, the no pooling model produces overdispersed estimates. Because they
restrict their analysis to the no pooling model, it is not surprising that they find more dispersion
in the treatment effects. My results differ in a similar fashion from the overall assessment of
Vivalt (2016) because despite using partial pooling methods, she uses metrics of heterogeneity
that include the sampling variation as well. The results of the Bayesian hierarchical model here
suggest that much of the apparent dispersion from the no-pooling models is due to sampling
variation, and the real underlying heterogeneity is much smaller.
5 understanding Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects
5.1 Household-level Covariates
Despite the substantial pooling, there remains some heterogeneity in treatment effects across
sites. This may be due to a variety of contextual variables that affect households, or variables
that affect the sites and studies themselves. Ideally we would like to understand the extent
to which conditioning on these covariates can explain the heterogeneity between the observed
treatment effects. At the household level, researchers have identified several potentially impor-
tant covariates such as a household’s previous business experience, urban versus rural location,
and group versus individual loans (Banerjee et al 2015b, Crepon et al 2015). It is possible
that heterogeneous effects across sites are due to differences in composition of household types;
alternatively, it is possible that the heterogeneity across sites is generated within one subgroup
only. Fitting a fully interacted model with a separate control mean and treatment effect for each
of the 8 subgroups implied by all combinations of these 3 variables would be ideal, but this is
challenging because two of these variables (loan type and location) did not vary within site at
all for 5 of the 7 studies. By contrast, prior business ownership varied within site for all studies
except Karlan and Zinman 2011, so this is the natural variable to examine in detail.
I fit an interactions model from equations 2.4, enforcing independence in the parent dis-
tribution for tractability, and focusing on a single household covariate: a binary indicator on
whether the household already operated a business before any microcredit expansion. Denote
this variable PB, where PB = 1 if the household operated a business prior to the microcredit
intervention. The results from fitting the fully interacted model with this covariate show that
the households where PB = 1 exhibit much more heterogeneity in treatment effects across sites.
Figure 10 shows the posterior distributions of the general impacts for the two groups, and figure
11 shows the posterior distributions of the impacts for each group in each site. While revenues
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and expenditures seem to rise for both groups - albeit less for the group with new businesses -
only the households with prior business experience appear likely to be making profits. In fact,
the treatment effect on profit is almost exactly zero in every site (panel 1 of figure 11). This
suggests that these new business owners are either less productive types or must require a lot of
learning or experimentation with their business before they can make profit.
Overall, there is little cross-site heterogeneity for the households who did not operate a
business before the treatment - the only variable which exhibits any variation across site for
this group is revenues which is the most volatile outcome in any case. By contrast there is
substantial heterogeneity across sites for the households who did operate a previous business -
they make up only 27% of the sample, but they generate most of the cross-site heterogeneity.
The posterior means of their additional treatment effects on household profit range from -22
USD PPP to 68 USD PPP per two weeks, although the posteriors themselves are extremely
diffuse with very large intervals. The increased heterogeneity in the group with prior business
experience is also evident by the much wider posterior predictive distributions for the effects in
this group, as shown in figure 12.
These results illustrate how multi-study analysis can help to combat the problems of searching
over subgroups for statistically significant effects. When the researchers who ran the RCT in
India (Banerjee et al 2015) checked for this same subgroup, which comprised 29% of their
sample, they found a very large, statistically significant effect here. But the other sites show
that this is not always the case - in some cases this subgroup displays a negligible effect, and
in others the effect is large and negative. While the general treatment effect for the subgroup
of households who had a previous business is indeed much higher than for those without, the
posterior distribution of this additional effect is extremely diffuse, and zero is contained in the
central 95% intervals. While there is much more activity in this subgroup, it is not the case that
the impact of microcredit is conclusively positive overall even here, as the heterogeneity across
sites is much more pronounced in this group.
5.2 Site-level Covariates
Important contextual variables also occur at the site or study level, and conditioning on these
covariates could explain the remaining heterogeneity between the observed treatment effects.
Unfortunately, in the microcredit literature, we face the severe challenge of assessing the role of
these covariates with only 7 studies to use as data points. Yet researchers and commentators
are already computing these correlations and theorising about the role of contextual variables
such as credit market saturation (see for example Wydick 2015). It is highly misleading to focus
the analysis on any one contextual variable, because there are many such variables which may
be more strongly correlated with the treatment effects if only they were included in the model.
To rigorously study the correlations at the site level, the best we can do is regress the treatment
effects on all relevant contextual variables using a regularization procedure such as Ridge or
Lasso in order to avoid overfitting and detect only the most powerful correlations.
This exercise can be performed within the Bayesian hierarchical models from section 2 by
modifying the second level of the likelihood to have a regression structure on the mean. Consider
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a set of S contextual variables, stored in a vector denoted Xk for site k. Then we can specify
that τk ∼ N(τ + Xkβ, σ2τ ) for all sites, and re-estimate the model. If, as is the case here, the
dimensionality of Xk is equal to or larger than K, we must enforce sparsity using very strong
priors that each element of the slope vector β is zero. I standardise all variables to have zero
mean and a standard deviation of 1, and use a spherical Ridge prior such that for each row s of
the slope vector β, the prior is β[s] ∼ N(0, 0.5). This implements Bayesian Ridge, in which only
the variables with the strongest predictive power for the pattern in {τk}Kk=1 end up with large
coefficients, in a similar fashion to the frequentist Ridge procedure (Griffin and Brown, 2013).
For this data I have tested Ridge penalties of size 0.25, 0.5, 1, and 3 with no resulting change
in the ordering of coefficients.
I consider a model with many site-level contextual variables, although this is not exhaustive.
In the order in which they appear in the Xk vector, they are: the site’s average value of the
outcome in the control group, a binary indicator on whether the unit of study randomization was
individuals or communities, a binary indicator on whether the MFI targeted female borrowers,
the interest rate (APR) at which the MFI in the study usually lends, a microcredit market sat-
uration metric taking integer values from 0-3, a binary indicator on whether the MFI promoted
the loans to the public in the treatment areas, a binary indicator on whether the loans were
supposed to be collateralized, and the loan size as a percentage of the country’s average income
per capita. Table 1 displays the values taken by each of these variables in each site, although of
course they must be standardized for any sparsity estimation procedure.
The results of a Ridge regression at the study level are shown in figure 13, which displays
the absolute magnitude of the coefficients on the various contextual variables for each of the 6
outcomes. The larger the magnitude, the more important is the variable as a predictor of the
treatment effects for that outcome (Hastie et al, 2009). The figure shows that the most predictive
variable is the average interest rate the MFI offers on the loans, followed by the average loan
size as a percentage of national household income. The unit of randomization is not highly
predictive despite the theoretical case for selection bias in the studies that randomized at the
individual level. This could be because the unit of randomization is correlated with the control
group mean, although in that case it is still the correct procedure to include both the control
mean and the unit of randomization in the Ridge regression. However, to make the point that
the unit of randomization is not a strong predictor, I perform a full Bayesian Ridge on both the
control mean and the treatment effect, omitting the control mean as an explanatory factor for
the treatment effects. I find that the correlation between the interest rate and treatment effects
is still much larger than the correlation with the unit of randomization (see figure 14). Thus,
these results suggest that the observed heterogeneity is not a function of study design protocols,
but rather of genuine economic differences across the settings.
6 Conclusion
Applying the framework of Bayesian hierarchical models to aggregate the evidence from 7 ran-
domized experiments of expanding access to microcredit has substantially improved our under-
standing of both the general impact of the intervention and the heterogeneity across contexts.
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My results suggest that the effect of microcredit access is likely to be positive but small in mag-
nitude relative to control group average levels, and the possibility of a negative impact cannot
be ruled out. By contrast, full-pooling methods misleadingly produce “statistically significant”
results in 2 of the 6 outcomes I study. Standard pooling metrics for the studies indicate on
average 60% pooling on the treatment effects, suggesting that the site-specific effects are reason-
ably informative and externally valid for each other and for the general case. Further analysis
incorporating household covariates shows that the cross-study heterogeneity is almost entirely
generated by heterogeneous effects for the 27% households who previously operated businesses
before microcredit expansion. Assessing the role of site-specific covariates using a Ridge proce-
dure indicates that economic variables, in particular the interest rate on the microloans and the
loan size, have the strongest correlation with the treatment effects.
Although these results provide us with a deep understanding of the evidence on the impact of
expanding access to microcredit, some unresolved questions remain. One major concern is that
microcredit could affect household or village welfare without affecting the average outcomes:
perhaps households use these loans to manage risk, or reallocate investment or consumption
towards more durable or lumpy goods. There could also be heterogeneous effects of microcredit
within villages - this is why the original papers reported quantile treatment effects at each decile
(see for example Banerjee et al 2015). However, aggregating quantile treatment effects using
Bayesian hierarchical models would require partial pooling while respecting monotonicity of
the conditional quantiles. Such methods have not yet been developed, but this should be the
focus of future research. Another issue I have not addressed in this paper is that of combining
experimental and observational data. I chose instead to focus on the experimental studies, in
which the estimated effects are more credibly causal. However, building a structure that can
account for the differing strength of the exclusion restrictions across studies into the Bayesian
hierarchical framework should also be a priority for future work.
Nevertheless, the results presented here do illustrate the importance of rigorously aggregating
evidence across heterogeneous settings in development economics. My results differ substantially
from the conclusions drawn in informal review articles such as Banerjee et al (2015a) and previous
attempts to formally aggregate evidence on microcredit such as Pritchett and Sandefur (2015)
and Vivalt (2016) which failed to separate sampling variation in the estimates from genuine
underlying heterogeneity. The results of the Bayesian hierarchical model also differ from the
results of more common full-pooling aggregation methods, which in 2 of the 6 outcomes would
misleadingly detect a “statistically significant” result on average. While the econometric issues
involved in evidence aggregation may seem abstract or technical, they can have a major impact on
the conclusions we draw from the evidence we have. If development economists seek to produce
reliable bodies of generalizable evidence for policymakers to use, then aggregating results and
assessing external validity via Bayesian hierarchical models should become a core part of the
research-to-policy pipeline.
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Figure 1: Graph of posteriors for each τ from the main specification of the joint model, with
the full pooling OLS intervals for comparison.
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Figure 2: Graph of posteriors for each τ from the independent model, with the full pooling OLS
intervals for comparison.
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Figure 3: Graph of posteriors for each τk from the main specification of the joint model, with
the no-pooling OLS intervals for comparison. As the scales of the sampling error differ across
sites, some intervals have not been fully shown here. The tables in Appendix A provide the
values of these 4 quantiles and the mean for all marginal posteriors for the main specification
model.
23
Bosnia
Ethiopia
India
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Philippines
−50 0 50 100 150
Posterior mean, 50% interval (box), and 95% interval (line) 
 for each Treatment Effect (USD PPP per 2 weeks)
BHM Posterior OLS
Business Profit
Bosnia
Ethiopia
India
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Philippines
−100 0 100 200 300
Posterior mean, 50% interval (box), and 95% interval (line) 
 for each Treatment Effect (USD PPP per 2 weeks)
BHM Posterior OLS
Business Revenues
Bosnia
Ethiopia
India
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Philippines
−100 0 100 200 300
Posterior mean, 50% interval (box), and 95% interval (line) 
 for each Treatment Effect (USD PPP per 2 weeks)
BHM Posterior OLS
Business Expenditures
Bosnia
India
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
−50 0 50 100
Posterior mean, 50% interval (box), and 95% interval (line) 
 for each Treatment Effect (USD PPP per 2 weeks)
BHM Posterior OLS
Consumption Spending
Bosnia
India
Mongolia
Morocco
−100 0 100 200 300
Posterior mean, 50% interval (box), and 95% interval (line) 
 for each Treatment Effect (USD PPP per 2 weeks)
BHM Posterior OLS
Consumer Durables Spending
Bosnia
India
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
−20 −10 0 10
Posterior mean, 50% interval (box), and 95% interval (line) 
 for each Treatment Effect (USD PPP per 2 weeks)
BHM Posterior OLS
Temptation Goods Spending
Figure 4: Graph of posteriors for each τk from the independent model, with the no-pooling OLS
intervals for comparison.
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Figure 6: Pooling metrics for all outcomes for the main specification
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Figure 7: Pooling metrics for all outcomes for the independent model specification
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Figure 8: Posterior predictive distributions for the next site, τK+1
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Figure 9: Posterior predictive distributions for the next site, τK+1 from the independent model
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Figure 10: Posterior distributions of τ for all outcomes split by prior business ownership
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Figure 11: Posterior distributions of τk for all sites and outcomes split by prior business owner-
ship
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Figure 12: Posterior predictive distributions of τK+1 split by prior business ownership
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Contextual Variables (Pre-Standardization)
Rand unit Women APR Saturation Promotion Collateral Loan size
Mexico (Angelucci) 0 1 100.00 2 1 0 6.00
Mongolia (Attanasio) 0 1 120.00 1 0 1 36.00
Bosnia (Augsberg) 1 0 22.00 2 0 1 9.00
India (Banerjee) 0 1 24.00 3 0 0 22.00
Morocco (Crepon) 0 0 13.50 0 1 0 21.00
Philippines (Karlan) 1 0 63.00 1 0 0 24.10
Ethiopia (Tarozzi) 0 0 12.00 1 0 0 118.00
Table 1: Contextual Variables: Unit of randomization (1 = individual, 0 = community), Women
(1= MFI targets women, 0 = otherwise), APR (annual interest rate), Saturation metric (3 =
highly saturated, 0 = no other microlenders operate), Promotion (1 = MFI advertised itself in
area, 0 = no advertising), Collateral (1 = MFI required collateral, 0 = no collateral required),
Loan size (percentage of mean national income)
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anRand unitTarget Wo
menAPRMarket Sa
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Figure 13: Absolute Magnitude of the Ridge Regression Coefficients for all outcomes and co-
variates
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Figure 14: Absolute Magnitude of the Full Bayesian Ridge Regression Coefficients for all out-
comes and covariates, omitting the control group mean
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Appendices
A Tables of Marginal Posteriors for the Main Specification
Marginal Posteriors of the Joint Model: Profit
mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
µ 94.81 -20.6 59.18 93.57 129.76 213.79
τ 6.81 -3.03 1.82 5.37 10.38 24.49
µ1 12.52 5.3 9.91 12.47 15.11 20.06
τ1 -0.77 -10.96 -3.68 -0.48 2.36 8.18
µ2 -0.68 -1.07 -0.81 -0.68 -0.55 -0.3
τ2 -0.34 -0.77 -0.49 -0.33 -0.18 0.1
µ3 111.24 87.97 103.71 111.56 119.07 132.83
τ3 11.27 -4.6 2.66 8.71 17.52 39.93
µ4 34.04 19.15 29.19 34.34 39.1 47.52
τ4 8.09 -4.54 2.09 6.77 12.98 26.9
µ5 85.38 71.05 80.57 85.45 90.26 99.56
τ5 9.04 -3.82 2.63 7.7 14.32 28.32
µ6 405.16 329.58 381.67 406.12 430.37 472.85
τ6 15.01 -11.79 1.79 9.44 22.88 71.11
µ7 14.1 4.13 10.81 14.21 17.44 23.46
τ7 5.29 -4.98 1.22 4.6 9.03 18.24
σy1 378.27 374.27 376.82 378.26 379.69 382.39
σy2 3.08 2.94 3.03 3.07 3.12 3.22
σy3 342.13 328.92 337.22 342.07 346.83 355.98
σy4 489.49 481.24 486.58 489.46 492.36 497.86
σy5 422.74 414.91 420.04 422.72 425.45 430.71
σy6 1041.14 999.38 1026.14 1040.63 1056.03 1084.79
σy7 220.16 214.7 218.26 220.1 222.03 225.82
Ω11 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ω12 0.2 -0.58 -0.07 0.23 0.5 0.84
Ω21 0.2 -0.58 -0.07 0.23 0.5 0.84
Ω22 1 1 1 1 1 1
θ1 146.64 80.43 112.58 137.02 169.54 268.84
θ2 9.35 1.66 4.39 7.67 12.26 27.38
V11 23982.21 6469.65 12674.01 18774.8 28745.47 72274.9
V12 319.52 -838.72 -51.43 181.18 570.83 2151.07
V21 319.52 -838.72 -51.43 181.18 570.83 2151.07
V22 136.25 2.77 19.29 58.89 150.3 749.71
µK+1 93.75 -234.71 -4.12 92.62 191.91 424.15
τK+1 6.89 -15.7 -0.41 4.49 12.35 40.04
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Marginal Posteriors of the Joint Model: Revenues
mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
µ 306.17 -87.46 185.89 307.29 428.43 696.44
τ 14.45 -1.4 6.58 12.13 19.93 43.53
µ1 45.03 39.02 42.92 44.99 47.09 51.43
τ1 9.36 0.73 6.57 9.41 12.25 17.59
µ2 1.05 0.76 0.95 1.05 1.16 1.35
τ2 -0.07 -0.41 -0.18 -0.07 0.05 0.28
µ3 185.16 142.49 170.94 185.42 199.26 227.07
τ3 21.33 -4.43 7.58 16.67 30.76 71.28
µ4 208.88 172.23 196.54 209.04 221.51 244.39
τ4 14.78 -10.36 4.54 12.19 22.73 51.66
µ5 332.34 300.85 322.4 332.87 342.8 360.67
τ5 25.04 -1.25 10.71 21.05 36.02 70.68
µ6 1432.05 1281.01 1382.19 1432.74 1483.16 1578.58
τ6 20.64 -24.63 3.55 14.66 31.87 98.07
µ7 26.19 15.49 22.54 26.3 29.89 36.69
τ7 10.26 -2.59 5.4 9.99 14.87 24.6
σy1 276.33 273.38 275.29 276.34 277.37 279.33
σy2 2.42 2.31 2.38 2.42 2.45 2.53
σy3 637.45 612.49 628.43 637.14 646.2 663.8
σy4 1372.56 1349.97 1364.52 1372.38 1380.68 1395.55
σy5 891.33 874.85 885.55 891.32 897.01 908.61
σy6 2374.1 2279.02 2338.83 2373.71 2407.68 2475.84
σy7 225.62 220.06 223.73 225.58 227.5 231.14
Ω11 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ω12 0.13 -0.59 -0.14 0.15 0.41 0.78
Ω21 0.13 -0.59 -0.14 0.15 0.41 0.78
Ω22 1 1 1 1 1 1
θ1 521.33 300.62 407.33 488.99 595.67 942.13
θ2 14.98 3.02 7.4 12.03 19.29 43.64
V11 300053.45 90370.01 165914.61 239111 354826.33 887616.37
V12 1050.6 -6150.13 -677.52 651.58 2385.41 10298.03
V21 1050.6 -6150.13 -677.52 651.58 2385.41 10298.03
V22 343.41 9.1 54.73 144.83 372.08 1904.23
µK+1 304.8 -873.74 -45.89 302.79 657.91 1461.35
τK+1 14.4 -21.61 2.58 11.04 23.07 67.18
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Marginal Posteriors of the Joint Model: Expenditures
mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
µ 212.58 -83.92 124.88 213.75 298.43 503.32
τ 6.72 -2.3 2.57 5.54 9.7 22.07
µ1 34.84 26.51 32.13 34.93 37.63 42.63
τ1 8.83 -0.13 4.57 8.36 12.58 20.71
µ2 1.73 1.19 1.54 1.73 1.91 2.26
τ2 0.29 -0.34 0.09 0.29 0.5 0.9
µ3 69.45 46.4 61.55 69.4 77.39 91.62
τ3 9.2 -4.56 2.64 7.03 13.93 33.53
µ4 172.12 141.77 161.64 172.16 182.83 201.92
τ4 6.48 -9.89 1.06 5.11 10.89 28.58
µ5 194.17 174.09 187.73 194.6 200.84 212.92
τ5 10.39 -3.38 3.37 8.1 15.47 35.13
µ6 1033.17 910.58 991.14 1032.69 1075.59 1156.42
τ6 8.59 -19.09 -0.03 6.12 15.23 47.49
µ7 12.8 10.4 12.01 12.8 13.62 15.17
τ7 3.57 0.38 2.4 3.54 4.7 6.94
σy1 392.84 388.59 391.39 392.88 394.34 396.98
σy2 4.37 4.18 4.3 4.37 4.44 4.57
σy3 365.97 352.03 360.83 365.88 370.99 381.11
σy4 1208.67 1188.84 1201.45 1208.47 1215.66 1229.18
σy5 639.14 627.49 635.03 639.21 643.13 651.03
σy6 1984.82 1904.8 1955.37 1983.99 2013.98 2069.98
σy7 48.42 47.22 48 48.41 48.84 49.68
Ω11 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ω12 0.07 -0.67 -0.21 0.07 0.35 0.76
Ω21 0.07 -0.67 -0.21 0.07 0.35 0.76
Ω22 1 1 1 1 1 1
θ1 380.37 221.21 296.55 353.68 432.96 697.09
θ2 8.13 1.44 3.98 6.67 10.58 23.5
V11 160925.99 48934.79 87943.11 125090.07 187458.5 485934.76
V12 228.66 -2939.41 -416.46 111.14 800.89 3893.86
V21 228.66 -2939.41 -416.46 111.14 800.89 3893.86
V22 101.66 2.08 15.85 44.47 111.89 552.33
µK+1 214.85 -631.34 -41.05 211.81 468.59 1071.89
τK+1 6.69 -13.36 0.64 5.06 11.46 34.12
36
Marginal Posteriors of the Joint Model: Consumption
mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
µ 281.8 226.11 266.44 281.99 296.82 340.51
τ 3.44 -6.28 0.82 3.46 5.93 13.21
µ1 299.48 294.26 297.74 299.47 301.15 304.64
τ1 4.48 -2.06 2.19 4.44 6.64 11.49
µ2 310.69 280.94 300.57 310.55 320.78 339.16
τ2 5.57 -7.4 1.07 4.48 8.25 27
µ3 195.89 174.11 188.51 196.06 203.37 217.33
τ3 1.73 -17.94 -1.67 2.59 6.17 16.47
µ4 276.79 270.01 274.52 276.83 279.02 283.32
τ4 3.82 -4.09 1.2 3.75 6.3 12.17
µ5 325.15 317.29 322.67 325.06 327.69 332.77
τ5 1.44 -8.71 -1.26 1.8 4.58 9.59
σy1 262.18 259.21 261.2 262.19 263.14 265.09
σy2 444.06 424.74 437.35 444.02 450.72 463.98
σy3 302.02 289.19 297.34 301.81 306.66 315.31
σy4 226.13 222.43 224.8 226.12 227.41 229.97
σy5 222.94 218.82 221.52 222.93 224.37 227.08
Ω11 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ω12 0.02 -0.69 -0.27 0.02 0.29 0.74
Ω21 0.02 -0.69 -0.27 0.02 0.29 0.74
Ω22 1 1 1 1 1 1
θ1 56.02 28.42 41.42 51.23 63.98 113.85
θ2 5.55 0.75 2.12 4.07 7.15 19.07
V11 3677.94 807.93 1715.51 2624.56 4093.89 12961.37
V12 7.79 -317.28 -45.19 2.4 55.06 363.04
V21 7.79 -317.28 -45.19 2.4 55.06 363.04
V22 60.38 0.56 4.5 16.53 51.14 363.68
µK+1 281.91 146.46 244.37 281.64 319.68 415.24
τK+1 3.45 -14.45 -0.28 3.49 7.03 21.56
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Marginal Posteriors of the Joint Model: Consumer Durables
mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
µ 274.31 -317.48 107.71 287.34 459.81 818.9
τ 1.83 -3.9 0.67 1.6 2.88 8.29
µ1 5.34 4.52 5.09 5.34 5.62 6.15
τ1 1.09 0.18 0.76 1.08 1.41 2.06
µ2 1114.28 913.26 1049.05 1116.37 1179.95 1303.42
τ2 1.87 -12.06 -0.16 1.49 3.89 16.54
µ3 24.65 21.45 23.67 24.76 25.71 27.42
τ3 2.89 -0.33 1.43 2.61 4.15 7.28
µ4 6.43 3.71 5.56 6.41 7.34 9.18
τ4 1.52 -1.89 0.51 1.44 2.53 5.1
σy1 6.83 6.53 6.73 6.83 6.94 7.15
σy2 2973.79 2853.39 2927.51 2972.68 3018.15 3113.24
σy3 92.59 91.06 92.08 92.58 93.1 94.09
σy4 83.56 82.11 82.99 83.55 84.12 85.17
Ω11 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ω12 0.02 -0.72 -0.26 0.02 0.3 0.74
Ω21 0.02 -0.72 -0.26 0.02 0.3 0.74
Ω22 1 1 1 1 1 1
θ1 625.84 277.02 407.24 519.94 684.39 2122.43
θ2 3.36 0.31 1.01 2.21 4.25 13.23
V11 562199.05 76741 165846.9 270342.64 468388.27 4504714.78
V12 18.6 -2507.6 -275.11 11.62 327.21 2526.88
V21 18.6 -2507.6 -275.11 11.62 327.21 2526.88
V22 26.89 0.1 1.02 4.88 18.02 174.98
µK+1 271.94 -1287.38 -116.5 275.42 669.17 1787.86
τK+1 1.85 -9.21 0.11 1.52 3.53 13.67
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Marginal Posteriors of the Joint Model: Temptation Goods
mean 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
µ 18.64 3.9 14.51 18.7 22.81 33.09
τ -0.79 -3.33 -1.26 -0.7 -0.22 1.28
µ1 4.69 4.56 4.64 4.69 4.73 4.82
τ1 -0.09 -0.27 -0.15 -0.09 -0.02 0.09
µ2 8.28 5.42 7.44 8.33 9.18 10.8
τ2 0.03 -2.4 -0.78 -0.11 0.72 3.22
µ3 31.7 28.44 30.53 31.61 32.81 35.36
τ3 -1.99 -6.8 -2.97 -1.58 -0.64 0.71
µ4 15.79 14.92 15.5 15.8 16.08 16.63
τ4 -1.35 -2.54 -1.77 -1.36 -0.94 -0.1
µ5 32.03 31.08 31.71 32.04 32.35 32.96
τ5 -0.53 -1.81 -0.96 -0.52 -0.11 0.74
σy1 6.05 5.99 6.03 6.05 6.08 6.12
σy2 28.98 27.72 28.54 28.96 29.41 30.32
σy3 44.28 42.41 43.57 44.25 44.95 46.33
σy4 23.76 23.36 23.62 23.76 23.9 24.16
σy5 26.79 26.3 26.62 26.79 26.96 27.29
Ω11 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ω12 -0.16 -0.75 -0.42 -0.18 0.08 0.53
Ω21 -0.16 -0.75 -0.42 -0.18 0.08 0.53
Ω22 1 1 1 1 1 1
θ1 15.02 7.77 10.82 13.51 17.4 31.15
θ2 1.72 0.17 0.75 1.3 2.2 5.64
V11 266.32 60.37 116.98 182.43 302.87 970.36
V12 -4.18 -37.77 -7.63 -2.19 0.97 19.05
V21 -4.18 -37.77 -7.63 -2.19 0.97 19.05
V22 5.2 0.03 0.56 1.69 4.85 31.83
µK+1 18.67 -16.59 8.57 18.66 28.7 54.17
τK+1 -0.79 -6.27 -1.7 -0.64 0.16 4.05
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